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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMMERCIAL SPEECH - FED-
ERAL STATUTE PROHIBITING MAILING OF UNSOLICITED 
CONTRACEPTION ADVERTISEMENTS VIOLATES FIRST 
AMENDMENT AS APPLIED TO ACCURATE MAILINGS THAT 
CONTRIBUTE TO INFORMED DECISION MAKING. Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983). 
The United States Postal Service warned an advertiser of contracep-
tives that its proposed mailing of unsolicited advertisements was prohib-
ited under 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e) as nonmailable matter.l The advertiser 
brought an action in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive 
relief. It claimed that the statute, as applied to its mailings, violated the 
first amendment by preventing the distribution of the advertisements. 2 
The district court held the statute unconstitutional because it prohibited 
commercial speech, which is protected under the first amendment. The 
court deemed the statute more extensive than necessary to serve the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting the privacy of individuals in their 
homes. 3 On appeal,4 the Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. 
The Court held the statute unconstitutional as applied to the proposed 
mailings for three reasons. First, the alleged governmental interest in 
protecting people from receiving offensive material was insubstantial. 
Second, although the asserted governmental interest in aiding parental 
attempts to teach birth control was substantial, the regulation did not 
advance it, especially when other less restrictive means were available. 
Third, the statute was more extensive than necessary because it pre-
vented the dissemination of truthful information to adults and adoles-
cents who were legally entitled to purchase birth control products. 5 
1. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2877-78 (1983). The pertinent 
part of the statute is: "Any unsolicited advertisement of matter which is designed, 
adapted, or intended for preventing conception is nonmailable [and] shall not be 
carried or delivered by mail .... " 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) (1982). The statute is 
inapplicable when the sender has no commercial interest and when the advertise-
ment is solicited. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2877-78. The statute originated in the Com-
stock Act, Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, § 2. 17 Stat. 599 (1873) (current version 
at 39 U.S.c. § 3001(e)(2) (1982». The Act was designed to prohibit the mailing of 
obscene and immoral material. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2882. 
2. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp. v. Bolger, 526 F. Supp. 823, 825 (D.D.C. 1981), affd on 
other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2878 (1983). 
3. /d. at 829. The court suggested that the least restrictive alternative necessary to 
balance the advertiser's commercial interest with the government's privacy interest 
would be to have the mailing envelope obscure the contents, to label it prominently 
as containing unsolicited contraception promotion, and to state that federal law per-
mits recipients to remove their names from the mailing list pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 
§ 3008(a) (1982). Id. at 830. This suggestion was unchallenged on appeal. Bolger 
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2878-79 n.5 (1983). 
4. The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1252 (1982). Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2879. 
5. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2884-85. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Marshall, 
was unanimous. Justice Brennan did not participate and two concurring opinions 
were filed. In the first concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice 
O'Connor, argued that the governmental interests were substantial but that the stat-
ute's regulations were broader than necessary to serve those interests. Id. at 2887 
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Only recently has commercial speech been accorded first amend-
ment protection.6 Previously, courts adhered to the view announced in 
Valentine v. Chrestensen' that commercial advertising is unprotected by 
the first amendment. In Chrestensen, a municipal ordinance banning ad-
vertising in public places prevented a merchant from distributing hand-
bills that advertised his marine exhibit and that protested government 
wharfage regulations. The Court held that the ordinance did not violate 
the merchant's first amendment right to distribute the handbills. The 
often quoted reasoning was that the Constitution imposed no restraint on 
governmental regulation of "purely commercial advertising."8 The 
Court also set forth a policy rationale. Underlying the holding was the 
intent to prevent merchants from evading lawful regulation merely by 
including a noncommercial component to their advertising.9 
(Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring). In the second concurring opinion, Justice 
Stevens questioned the majority's conclusions that all of the mailings were properly 
classified as commercial speech. Because of the noncommercial components of the, 
mailings, Justice Stevens advocated the same level of scrutiny that would apply to 
mailings distributed by a party without a commercial interest. Justice Stevens fur-
ther reasoned that the statute violated the first amendment because it was an imper-
missible content regulation. [d. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
6. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 581 n.4 
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). Commercial speech falls under the first amend-
ment. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2879. The speech provision of the first amendment is: 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. It applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gros-
jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
(1925) (application assumed). 
Commercial speech is distinguished from noncommercial speech, which may 
be political, social, scientific, educational, economic, artistic, or literary speech. See 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,762-63 (1983); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 
23 (1973) (listing examples of protected speech, but not expressly distinguishing 
commercial from noncommercial speech); see infra note 37 and accompanying text 
for examples of noncommerical speech. Commercial speech protection has been 
applied in a variety of contexts. E.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 435 
U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (billboards); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (utility advertising); Bates v. State Bar 
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney advertising); Linmark Assocs. v. Town-
ship of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) ("for sale" signs). 
7. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
8. [d. at 54. The decision cited no precedents, prior case law, or contemporaneous 
lower court decisions attempting to reconcile governmental regulation of commer-
cial advertising with first amendment rights. See Chrestensen v. Valentine, 34 F. 
Supp. 596, 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Justice Douglas 
later described the Chrestensen holding as "casual, almost oftband" and not surviv-
ing on reflection. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, 
J., concurring). The Supreme Court subsequently characterized the holding as a 
manner regulation, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975), and as a mere 
"indication" that commercial speech is unprotected. Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 758 (1976). 
9. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942). This policy is still operative. See 
Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2881 (an advertiser's reference to a public issue should not 
immunize it from government regulation); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 
453 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Brennen, J., concurring) (commercial 
entities will try to take advantage of the "safe haven" of noncommercial speech). 
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Chrestensen came to stand for the old commercial speech doctrine, 
which divided speech into two categories: purely commercial advertis-
ing, or commercial speech, which was profit motivated and unprotected 
under the first amendment; and noncommercial speech, which received 
first amendment protection. lO The Chrestensen doctrine was narrowed 
as subsequent cases involved speech that was not readily identifiable as 
purely commercial or noncommercial. The result of these cases was the 
principle that economic motive alone would not render speech 
commercial. II 
The Supreme Court in effect overturned Chrestensen in Bigelow v. 
Virginia. 12 An agency had placed an advertisement for out of state abor-
tion services in a Virginia newspaper. The newspaper was charged with 
violating a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to encourage 
abortion in publications. \3 The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the 
statute under the Chrestensen doctrine that commercial speech was un-
protected. 14 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the govern-
ment may not prevent the dissemination or receipt of information 
concerning a lawful activity.ls The decision implied that three elements 
render speech commercial: the speech is a sales solicitation, is paid for, 
10. Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Con-
stitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 207-09 (1976). For informative treat-
ments of the origins and development of the commercial speech doctrine, see 
Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 
1080, 1084-96; Note, Constitutional Protection 0/ Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 720, 722-30 (1982). For criticism of the modern doctrine, see Farber, Com-
mercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1979) (com-
mercial speech as contract theory); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: 
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979) (commer-
cial speech values inappropriate under the first amendment). 
11. Eg., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (profit motive is immate-
rial when civil rights advertisement communicated information and opinion on mat-
ter of public concern); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (profit motive 
in selling religious publications is incidental to the right to disseminate religious 
publications). 
12. 421 U.S. 809, 818-20 (1975). The Supreme Court had earlier held that the commer-
cial selling of periodicals was within first amendment protection; however, the ban 
on door-to-door periodical sales was upheld as against community interest and not 
on commerical speech reasoning. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642, 645 
(1951). Chrestensen was more clearly limited in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 
819-21 (1975). See Comment, supra note 10; Comment, Legislative Choice and 
Commercial Speech: Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 1981 UTAH L. REV. 831; 
Note, Standard 0/ Revision/or Regulations o/Commercial Speech: Metromedia, Inc. 
v. City of San Diego, 66 MINN. L. REV. 903 (1982). See generally Rotunda, supra 
note 10 (Chrestensen overturned in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1973». 
13. 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975). 
14. Bigelow v. Virginia, 213 Va. 191, 193, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1972), rev'd, 421 U.S. 
809 (1975). 
15. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824-25; accord Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public 
Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (advertisement for energy sources); Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (in-person attorney advertising); Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney advertising); Linmark Assocs. 
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and is motivated by profit. 16 The Court found that the abortion adver-
tisement was more than a mere proposal of a commercial transaction; it 
pertained to a lawful activity - abortion - and communicated factual 
information of public interest,17 Balancing the state government's inter-
est in maintaining the quality of medical care within its borders against 
the public's interest in receiving the information, the Court held that the 
statute violated the newspaper's first amendment right. 18 The Court re-
jected the lower court's assumption that advertising was per se excluded 
from first amendment protection, but expressly left open the extent to 
which regulation may be permissible. 19 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council,20 the Supreme Court for the first time explicitly held that the 
first amendment protected commercial speech. The Court invalidated a 
Virginia statute that prohibited a pharmacist from publishing prescrip-
tion drug prices because the law violated the first amendment. 21 Virginia 
Pharmacy did not define commercial speech but characterized it in terms 
of policies. The Court described commercial speech as part of the "expo-
sition of ideas" protected by the first amendment.22 Advertisers have an 
economic interest in the exposition of certain ideas.23 Consumers have 
an interest in obtaining the free flow of commercial information so that 
they can obtain necessary products at affordable prices.24 Society has a 
general interest in the free flow of commercial information to ensure ac-
cess to available products and to ensure intelligent, well informed con-
sumer decisions. 25 
In dictum, the Court stated that time, place, and manner restrictions 
were permissible if they did not regulate the content of speech.26 Reason-
able time, place, and manner regulations may be imposed on any type of 
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) ("for sale" signs); Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (advertisement for contraceptives). 
16. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818. 
17. /d. at 822. 
18. Id. at 826-29. 
19. Id. at 825. 
20. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
21. Id. at 770, 773. 
22. Id. at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942». In a 
free market economy, society has an interest in the dissemination of information "as 
to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price." 
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; accord Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 
350, 364 (1977); see also Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 10, at 2 (commercial speech 
doctrine rests on distinction between economic marketplace and marketplace of 
ideas). 
23. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
364 (1977). 
24. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764; accord Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). 
25. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65; accord Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-9 
(1979); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977). 
26. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,200 (1982) 
(attorney advertising); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,9 (1979) (trade name). 
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speech27 when a significant governmental interest is involved and alterna-
tive channels of communication are left open.28 Time, place, and manner 
regulations are impermissible when they are based on the content or sub-
ject matter of the speech;29 censorship of the speaker's views is thereby 
avoided.30 Commercial speech, however, may be regulated for its con-
tent to the extent that the content is false, misleading, deceptive, or pro-
motes unlawful activity.3l 
The Virginia Pharmacy Court also noted that the prior restraint 
doctrine may not be applicable to commercial speech.32 The prior re-
straint doctrine refers to the interpretation of the first amendment as pre-
cluding the government from imposing restraints on a publication in 
advance of a judicial determination of whether the publication contains 
protected speech.33 Its rationale in part is to prevent government censor-
ship34 and facilitate a free flow of information. 35 It further encourages an 
informed public, interpreted by some commentators as a politically in-
27. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) 
(citing Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977)); Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. For time, place, and manner regulations in a 
noncommercial speech context, see Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (safety reasons on state fairgrounds); Adderley v. 
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (nonpublic property use). 
28. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981) (citations omitted); 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980). 
29. Consolidated Edison CO. V. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980); 
Linmark Assocs. V. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,93-94 (1977) (applica-
tion assumed); Police Dep't V. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). 
30. Consolidated Edison CO. V. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (citing Niemotko V. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951»). 
31. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. V. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 
(1980) (dictum); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy V. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (dictum). For specific examples see infra note 
49 and accompanying text. 
32. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24; cf Village of Hoffman Estates V. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 495-96 (1982) (prior restraint argument 
rejected because only noncommercial speech was implicated). 
33. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston V. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (citing Thornhill 
V. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940»); Grosjean V. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233, 245 (1936); Near V. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 735 (1931) (Butler, J., dissent-
ing). For a discussion of the historical origins of the prior restraint doctrine, see 
Nebraska Press Ass'n V. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-61 (1976); Grosjean V. American 
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-49 (1936); Near V. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-20 
(1931). For a discussion of the doctrine in a modem context, see O'Brien, Reassess-
ing the First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 265 VILL. L. REV. 1, 48-58 (1980). 
34. See Near V. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); e.g., Southeastern Promotions, 
Ltd. V. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (licensing); Lovell V. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
(1938) (same) (but cf FCC V. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (license 
renewal decision not in conflict with listeners' first amendment rights»; Grosjean V. 
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (taxation). The first amendment promotes 
the value that individuals should be free to think as they want, not as the govern-
ment wants them to think. See Abood V. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 
(1977). 
35. See Thornhill V. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). 
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formed public36 but interpreted by the Supreme Court as encompassing 
more than political speech.37 The first amendment creates a heavy pre-
sumption against prior restraint.38 Prior restraint of certain types of 
speech has been permitted, provided that standards are provided and 
procedural safeguards are taken to prevent suppression of associated pro-
tected speech.39 Because a chief purpose of the first amendment is to 
prevent prior restraint,40 first amendment protection accorded commer-
cial speech would be severely limited if the publication of all commercial 
speech were restrained prior to judicial determination of its status as pro-
tected or unprotected. 
The next major commercial speech case was Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.41 Whereas in Bigelow and 
Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court had used a balancing test to de-
termine if the first amendment protected the commercial speech at is-
sue,42 in Central Hudson the Court replaced the balancing test with a 
four-step analysis. The analysis determines whether the statutory prohi-
bition is the least restrictive means of achieving the substantial govern-
ment interest alleged.43 In Central Hudson, an administrative regulation 
prohibited promotional advertising (intended to stimulate purchase), but 
not informational advertising (not clearly intended to promote sales), as 
36. E.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 
(1971); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 10; O'Brien, supra note 33, at 48. 
37. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 
717 (1931); see also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (education); Schad 
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (entertainment); Brown v. 
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (military regulations); Madison School Dist. v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (labor); Book Named 
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413 
(1966) (literature). 
38. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 364 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bantam Books 
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
39. E.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984) (civil pretrial discov-
ery); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (military regulations); Snepp v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (classified information) (but cf Gannett 
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (press denied access to pre-criminal trial 
proceeding); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per 
curiam) (injunction against publication of Pentagon Papers denied because govern-
ment burden for enforcement of prior restraint not met»; United States v. Rosen-
berg, 195 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1952) (espionage act forbidding certain 
communications not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1953). For prior 
restraints not upheld because of lack of standards, see Southeastern Promotions, 
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (film); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 
(1971) (mail); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (film). 
40. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) 
(citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,70 (1963»; Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697,713 (1931). 
41. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
42. The interests of the speaker, the hearer, and the public were weighed against the 
asserted governmental interest. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 
826-29 (1975). 
43. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
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contrary to the national energy conservation policy.44 A utility company 
was thereby barred from mailing bill-inserts that explained different 
types of energy but also promoted the use of electricity. The Court held 
the prohibition invalid, reasoning that it was more extensive than neces-
sary and that other less restrictive means existed to serve the govern-
ment's interest.45 As in Virginia Pharmacy,46 the Court stated that three 
interests were involved: the consumer's interest in the free flow of infor-
mation that bears on consumer decisions, the advertiser's economic inter-
est in providing that information, and society's larger interest in the 
fullest dissemination of information.47 
The Central Hudson four-step test is important in modem commer-
cial speech analysis. Step one requires that the speech relate to a lawful 
activity and not be false, deceptive, or misleading.48 If this requirement 
is not satisfied, the speech may be governmentally prohibited or regu-
lated.49 If this initial requirement is satisfied, the next three steps of the 
analysis determine whether the state interest is substantial, whether the 
regulation directly advances the interest, and whether the regulation is 
the least restrictive means to serve that interest. 50 All four steps must be 
met to uphold the governmental regulation. 
The Central Hudson analysis is thus a least restrictive means test,51 
one of the tests used in analyzing noncommercial speech. The constitu-
tional standard applied to determine if the government may prohibit or 
regulate speech depends on the type of speech being regulated. 52 Some 
noncommercial speech, such as "fighting words," is analyzed under a 
"clear and present danger" test or a modern variant. 53 Other noncom-
mercial speech, such as symbolic speech, is analyzed under a least restric-
44. Id. at 558-59. 
45. Id. at 571-72. 
46. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
47. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-
62 (1980). 
48. Id. at 564, 566. 
49. E.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) 
(ordinance requiring license to sell drug-related paraphernalia does not violate first 
amendment); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (ban on deceptive communica-
tion); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (same); Pittsburgh Press 
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (sex-desig-
nated help-wanted ads unconstitutional when employment selection by sex is 
unlawful). 
50. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66. For later Supreme Court cases applying the 
test, see In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 
453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
51. Note, supra note 10, at 729. 
52. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976); J. NOWAK, R. 
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 858 (2d ed. 1983). 
53. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (fighting words); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (seditious speech); see also Landmark Communi-
cations, Inc., v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) Gudicial proceedings). 
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tive means test. 54 In analyzing commercial speech under the four-part 
test, the Central Hudson Court accorded commercial speech a higher 
standard of constitutional scrutiny than had existed under the balancing 
test. The Court applied to commercial speech one of the standards of 
analysis that had previously applied only to certain types of noncommer-
cial speech. Nonetheless, according to the Court, commercial speech re-
ceives a lesser standard of protection than noncommercial speech.55 
The Supreme Court has supported its position that commercial 
speech is entitled to less protection than noncommercial speech with 
three basic reasons. First, the Court consistently has cited a "common-
sense" distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. 56 
Second, the Court has emphasized that advertising has a greater poten-
tial for deception and confusion than has noncommercial speech 57 and 
therefore consumers need protection. 58 Third, commercial speech is 
more "durable" and less likely to be inhibited by regulation than non-
commercial speech.59 These reasons, however, assume a clear distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial speech. It is sometimes diffi-
cult, though, to distinguish the two, as in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp. 60 
In Youngs, a federal postal statute prevented an advertiser from 
mailing three types of materials: (1) contraceptive-only flyers; (2) multi-
item flyers, each providing brand name and pricing information; and (3) 
54. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (inmate correspondence); Police Dep't 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (picketing); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968) (symbolic speech). 
55. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). See also Bolger V. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 (1983); 
Metromedia, Inc. V. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,505 (1981) (plurality opinion); 
Ohralik V. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). Certain types of so-
called noncommercial speech may be unprotected by the first amendment. See, e.g., 
New York V. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Gertz V. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation); New York Times CO. V. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Roth V. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscene 
speech), modified, Miller V. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
56. Bolger V. Youngs Drug Prods., Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2875,2879 (1983) (citing Ohralik V. 
. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,455-56 (1978»; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy 
V. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). Some com-
mentators distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech by arguing that 
commercial speech falls outside of the traditional first amendment area. See, e.g., 
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 10, at 14; Note, supra note 10, at 725 nn.38-40. In 
addition, intrastate regulation of commercial enterprise historically has been a state 
rather than a federal matter. See Valentine V. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); 
Fifth Ave. Coach CO. V. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911). 
57. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982); Friedman V. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 
(1979); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
58. See Ohralik V. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460, 462 (1978). 
59. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy V. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 772 n.24 (1976). 
60. 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983). Cf Metromedia, Inc. V. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 
538-39 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing difficulty 
distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech). 
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informational pamphlets on venereal disease and on prophylactics.61 The 
Supreme Court held that all three types of materials were commercial 
speech62 and that the statutory ban on them was unconstitutional. 63 In 
determining whether the materials were commercial speech, the Court 
classified the single- and multi-item flyers as "speech which does 'no 
more than propose a commercial transaction."'64 The informational 
pamphlets, however, did not readily meet this core definition. The Court 
borrowed from prior decisions and identified three commercial speech 
elements. The material was an advertisement,65 referred to a specific 
product,66 and was economically motivated.67 The Court, without elabo-
ration, found all three elements present in the informational pamphlets; 
thus they were commercial speech. Each element alone was insufficient 
to render speech commercial, but not all three elements had to be 
present. 68 
The Court then applied the Central Hudson four-part test69 to deter-
mine whether the speech was protected. The state had asserted interests 
in preventing the dissemination of offensive material and in assisting par-
ents to control the receipt of contraceptive information by their children. 
Under the first step of the analysis, the Court found no evidence of false, 
deceptive, or misleading promotional techniques and that contraception 
and contraceptive advertising were lawful activities.70 The second part of 
the analysis resulted in two determinations. The Court found that the 
governmental interest in shielding people from offensive material was in-
sufficient to justify suppression of the speech; mail recipients could avoid 
material they considered offensive by throwing it away or by removing 
their names from the advertiser's mailing list.71 The governmental inter-
est in assisting parental attempts to regulate their children's acquisition 
of birth control information, however, was found to be substantial be-
61. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2877-78. 
62. Id. at 2880. 
63. Id. at 2885. 
64. Id. at 2880 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n 
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
65. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
265-66 (1964)). 
66. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Associated Students v. Attorney Gen., 368 F. 
Supp. II, 24 (C.D. Cal. 1983)). 
67. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975)). 
68. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2880. Two of the three elements are, therefore, sufficient to 
render speech commercial. The Court suggested that reference to a specific prod-
uct, which is a new element in Supreme Court commercial speech cases, is the unre-
quired one. Id. at 2880-81 n.14. Thus, for example, a television commercial 
promoting dairy products without mentioning a specific brand might be commercial 
speech. 
69. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
70. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2881-82. 
71. Id. at 2883. Names may be removed from mailing lists under 39 U.S.C. § 3008(a) 
(1982). Rowen v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
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cause of parents' important role in teaching their children.72 
Even though the Court considered the state interest in assisting par-
ents to be substantial, the regulation failed under the third Central Hud-
son step because it did not directly advance that interest. The Court 
reasoned that parents can control disposition of mail once it enters their 
mailboxes, and that contraceptive advertisements are just one of many 
ways to receive sexual information.73 
The statute also failed under the final step of the analysis because it 
prevented adults and adolescents from receiving information to which 
they were entitled.74 The prohibition of information pertaining to a deci-
sion people have a right to make, according to the Youngs Court, is a 
basic constitutional violation.75 
The Youngs decision that the advertiser's items were protected mail-
able material is well reasoned. The mailings related to a lawful activity, 
were accurate, and concerned information helpful to informed decision 
making. They thus served the first amendment commercial speech inter-
ests of consumer, advertiser, and society. 
The problem with the decision, however, is the classification of the 
venereal disease pamphlet as commercial speech. The pamphlet does not 
meet the requisite elements of being an advertisement, referring to a spe-
cific product, and being economically motivated. Because the venereal 
disease pamphlet does not fit the requisite elements, it is noncommercial 
speech and should not have been subject to the Central Hudson four-part 
test. For the "advertisement" element, the Youngs Court cited New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, which accorded a nonprofit social action advertise-
ment the same degree of protection as ordinary speech.76 The speech in 
New York Times was a paid newspaper advertisement, while in Youngs 
what was paid for was not advertising space but the printing and mailing 
of the pamphlets themselves. The New York Times advertisement solic-
ited money. The Youngs pamphlet solicited nothing. 
Regarding the element of reference to a specific product, the pam-
phlet generically mentioned products, such as prophylactics and 
douches, that aid in prevention of venereal disease. No brand names 
were given; however, the advertiser's name as the source of the pamphlet 
was noted in small letters on the last page.77 
The third and most consistent element of commercial speech is eco-
nomic motivation. The venereal disease pamphlet was ultimately eco-
nomically motivated, but its immediate function was informational. It 
72. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2883-84. 
73. Id. at 2884. 
74. Id. at 2884-85. 
75. Id. at 2885. 
76. Id. at 2880 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 265-66 (1964». 
77. Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2880 n.13. The Court reasoned that generic reference to a 
product is nevertheless commercial speech and cited as examples a manufacturer's 
name nearly synonomous with its brand name, and a trade association product pro-
motion. Id. 
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was not designed to solicit direct sales. Six of its eight pages explained 
general, non prophylactic venereal disease information; no price, product 
description, or specific purchase location information was provided.78 
There was nothing to persuade the reader to buy one advertiser's brand 
over another advertiser's brand, although the reader might have been 
persuaded to use prophylactics preventively. The pamphlet thus had a 
remote buying influence, if any, on the consumer. The pamphlet is more 
properly classified as a public service pamphlet or as public relations 
advertising. 
The misclassification presents a moot issue in Youngs because the 
mailings were permitted. By labeling the venereal disease pamphlet as 
commercial speech, however, Youngs extends the definition of commer-
cial speech to include commercial public service advertising. As a result, 
commercially generated public service advertising is indistinguishable 
from direct sales advertising for purposes of first amendment commercial 
speech analysis. 79 
In addition to assigning the venereal disease pamphlet commercial 
speech elements that do not clearly apply, the Supreme Court's classifica-
tion of the pamphlet is problematic for a second reason. The same 
pamphlet, absent reference to the advertiser, would constitute 
noncommercial speech if distributed by a noncommercial source, such as 
a clinic or student association.80 The pamphlet would be considered non-
commercial speech because the required element of economic motivation 
would be absent. 8l That the same content is in the one instance commer-
78. Brief for Appellee at 25-32, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 
(1983). 
79. Public service advertising is becoming increasingly more frequent. Alsop, These Ads 
Sell Food Stamps and Sobriety - and With Style, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1985, at 31, 
col. 1. For an earlier case implying a distinction between public service and promo-
tional advertising, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980), discussed, supra note 44 and accompanying text. For commer-
cial speech concepts that have been extended so broadly as to be applied in a nonad-
vertising context, see Securities and Exch. Comm'n V. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 
1984) (investment newsletter held to be commercial speech because it was sold and 
was devoted to economic interests), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984). For a discus-
sion of the implications of Lowe, see Riley, New Step for the 'Commercial Speech' 
Doctrine?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 8, cols. 1-4. 
80. Associated Students V. Attorney Gen., 368 F. Supp. 11,24 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (unso-
licited contraceptive advertisements mailed by student government are noncommer-
cial speech) (cited with approval in Youngs, 103 S. Ct. at 2880). Cf Metromedia, 
Inc. V. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (ordinance re-
stricting billboard locations valid for commercial speech but invalid for noncom-
mercial speech). 
81. What seems to be meant by "economic motivation" in the context of public service 
advertising is the possibility that the advertiser will increase its market share regard-
less of whether the increase will occur immediately, and regardless of whether the 
advertiser will also increase the market shares of its competitors. For a case discuss-
ing the use of advertising to build a market rather than to acquire a larger market 
share, see Dunagin V. City of Oxford, Miss.; 718 F.2d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 1983). For 
an argument that the speaker's motivation should be irrelevant in commercial 
speech analysis, see Note, supra note 10, at 745. 
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cial speech, but in the other noncommercial speech, highlights the ques-
tionable nature of a classification based on economic motivation. Such a 
result contradicts the Court's position that economic motivation alone is 
insufficient to render speech commercial. 82 The result disguises a con-
tent-based regulation. Moreover, it is speculative whether the same 
wording and format are actually more deceptive or "durable" if pro-
duced by a commercial source than by a noncommercial one. 83 With 
public service advertising such as the Youngs pamphlet, the so-called 
"common-sense" distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech84 breaks down. 
There is another significant feature to Youngs. It impliedly supports 
the principle, suggested in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council,8s that the doctrine of prior restraint is inap-
plicable to commercial speech. The postal statute constituted a prior re-
straint because it prohibited any mailing of unsolicited contraceptive 
advertisements, without requiring a judicial determination of whether the 
advertisements constituted protected speech. Youngs held that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional as applied to the advertiser, not that it was un-
constitutional on its face. The statute is, therefore, still valid and 
continues to operate as a prior restraint on advertisers. A prior restraint 
is a serious infringement of first amendment rights.86 First amendment 
protection for commercial speech is already limited by content regulation 
for falsity, deception, and unlawful conductY The inapplicability of the 
prior restraint doctrine would further narrow the extent of first amend-
ment protection accorded to commercial speech.88 
The possible imposition of prior restraint on commercial speech 
may result in an inability to predict whether specific advertising is consti-
tutionally protected. Under Youngs, an advertiser might be obligated to 
obtain government permission before it mails its advertisements. The 
82. See supra notes 11 and 68 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
85. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
86. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713,723 (1971) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring). In 
addition, restriction of the use of the mails is not an insignificant restraint on first 
amendment rights. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971). 
87. See supra notes 26 and 48 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The inapplicability of the prior restraint 
doctrine helps explain what the Supreme Court means by the principle that com-
mercial speech receives less protection than noncommercial speech. The first 
amendment overbreadth doctrine also seems to be inapplicable to commercial 
speech, thereby reducing first amendment protection; it allows a litigant to challenge 
a statute on grounds that it violates the first amendment broadly but not the liti-
gant's conduct specifically. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 
U.S. 490, 504 n.ll (1981) (plurality opinion); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 
U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 
(1977). 
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standards for granting governmental permission are not set forth in 
Youngs, and permissible prior restraints require standards. 89 The adver-
tiser alternatively may waste time, money, and judicial resources in liti-
gating the permissibility of its mailings; or it may decide not to mail the 
advertisements, thus chilling the speech. 
Prior restraint is inconsistent with the function of commercial 
speech as serving the interests of the consumer, advertiser, and society in 
the free flow of information.90 Information does not flow freely if with-
held by statute or subject to government approval before mailing, and 
consequently may be delayed or denied to consumers. The Youngs Court 
reasoned that the prohibition of information pertaining to a consumer's 
decision was not justified by any counterbalancing state interest. 91 The 
Supreme Court has already protected the public by permitting regulation 
to ensure that commercial speech relates to a lawful activity and is not 
false, misleading, or deceptive. An additional limitation on the free flow 
of commercial speech, in the form of prior restraint, is unnecessary and 
antithetical to the reasoning the Court has offered to justify protection of 
commercial speech.92 
The Youngs decision affirms prior case law in two important re-
spects. First, under the modem commercial speech doctrine the first 
amendment protects commercial speech because of its informational 
value. Second, commercial speech is analyzed under the Central Hudson 
four-step test and is subject to content regulation to prevent falsity, de-
ception, and promotion of unlawful activity. The Youngs decision clari-
fies prior case law in two important respects. First, it broadens the range 
of commercial speech to include commercial public service advertising. 
Second, the prior restraint doctrine may be inapplicable to commercial 
speech, thus enabling the government to impose restraints on speech 
before the speech ever reaches its hearers. The threshold question in 
modem commercial speech analysis is whether the speech is commercial. 
If speech is mislabeled commercial, it is subject to potentially unjustifi-
able governmental regulation of its content. 
Janet S. Hankin 
89. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's reason-
ing as to why the first amendment protects commercial speech. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted Youngs as standing for the proposition that 
the first amendment precludes governmental regulation of speech that favors one 
viewpoint at the expense of another. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2128 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting signs on 
public property constitutional as applied to supporters of political candidate). Jus-
tice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Vincent and a concurring opinion in 
Youngs. The Vincent interpretation of Youngs seems to be based more on Justice 
Stevens's concurring opinion than on the majority opinion in Youngs. See Youngs, 
103 S. Ct. at 2888. 
